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Cornhusker Economics
Do We Need More Futures Contracts
in Commodity Markets?
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

11-24-18

120.50

115.00

117.01

180.17

172.62

172.26

165.83

160.01

150.03

208.70

211.50

213.76

57.03

58.38

49.32

81.14

75.57

65.86

NA

135.62

NA

388.34

378.61

376.40

3.14

4.46

4.25

3.11

3.34

3.34

9.03

7.32

7.57

5.42

5.30

5.25

2.83

3.16

3.12

162.50

108.00

*

80.00

105.00

110.00

80.50

87.50

87.50

142.00

135.00

160.00

42.00

48.50

49.75

In the last couple of months, there has been news
about a new futures contract for soybeans. The Financial Times and Reuters, among others, reported
that the CME Group, the world’s largest futures exchange, is considering launching a futures contract
based on Brazilian soybeans. The discussion seems to
have started after trade issues between the United
States and China resulted in a 25 percentage-point
tariff on U.S. soybeans exported to China. As Chinese buyers try to avoid the tariff by purchasing
grain from other suppliers, notably Brazil, a new
price dynamics between U.S. and Brazilian soybeans
could be emerging. This raises the question of whether there would still be enough price correlation between the two countries for Brazilian producers and
merchandisers to use the Chicago futures contract to
hedge their soybean transactions. If the soybean
price in Brazil is really becoming less correlated with
the soybean price in the U.S., the local basis in Brazil
will be less predictable and hence the hedging with
Chicago futures contracts will become relatively less
effective.
A similar idea came out in the early 2000’s, which
resulted in the Chicago Board of Trade (which is
now part of the CME Group) eventually launching
its South American soybean futures contract in May
2005. The new futures contract had delivery points in
Brazil and hence was expected to reduce basis risk
for Brazilian hedgers compared to the traditional
soybean futures contract at the Chicago Board of
Trade. However, the contract never attracted many
producers and merchandisers with commercial interests in Brazil, and neither had it attracted many
speculators. Since this contract never gained much
trading activity, it was terminated after a while.

It is the policy of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln not to discriminate based upon age, race,
ethnicity, color, national origin, gender-identity, sex, pregnancy, disability, sexual orientation,
genetic information, veteran’s status, marital status, religion or political affiliation.

One of the main issues with the South American soybean
futures contract created in 2005 was the same that afflicted
other new futures contracts in history, which is the inertia
of liquidity. The success of futures markets in commodities,
equities, currencies and other asset classes relies, among
other things, on the fact that it concentrates in the same
place a large number of buyers and sellers willing to do
business. This is actually one of the main reasons why futures markets were created a long time ago, i.e. to offer buyers and sellers a centralized marketplace where it would be
easier and faster to find someone to trade with at a price
that was satisfactory for both sides of the trade.
However, when new futures contracts are created, traders
are often cautious in the beginning, and they do not trade
as heavily as they would in more established futures contracts. They still want to learn how the new contract works,
who is trading there, how the prices for the new contract
behave, how much they can trade without moving the market, and so on. But if nobody really starts trading more
heavily until others do, trading activity will never pick up.
This is what commonly happens with new futures contracts, and also one of the main reasons why many of them
are eventually terminated.
Is it common to have more than one actively traded futures market for agricultural commodities?
In the world of agricultural commodities, there is typically
one futures contract for each commodity. It is unusual to
find more than one futures contract on the same commodity (except for commodities with different varieties, such as
wheat and coffee), mostly because of the liquidity issue that
we discussed above. Still, in 2012, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) tried to create more competition in the market by launching futures contracts on corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil, which had already
been trading in the CME Group for several decades. All of
the ICE new contracts resembled the futures contracts traded at the CME Group and were actually based on the CME
Group’s own prices. The ICE tried to gain some market
share in the futures trading for grains and oilseeds by offering essentially the same futures contracts as the CME
Group, but with extended trading hours and lower margin
requirements. Again, traders chose to wait and see what
others would do before they started trading and it turns out
that these contracts never attracted much trading activity
and were eventually terminated last summer.
An old adage in futures markets says, “Liquidity begets liquidity”. Markets with high trading activity will often attract more traders, while markets with low trading activity
will rarely attract more traders. For any new futures contract, the main challenge is how to attract enough traders to
create sufficient activity that will encourage other traders to
join the market. For example, if a new soybean futures contract is created, traders (both hedgers and speculators) will

essentially be asking the questions: “Can the new contract give me something that the existing contract cannot?” and “Will I benefit from the new contract even if
it may not be as highly traded as the existing contract?” (Some interesting readings about this topic can
be found in [1, 2, 3]).
New developments in different commodity markets
may create more interest in new futures contracts over
time. For example, a recent article about the wheat market discusses how the decline of U.S. share in production and exports and the emergence of former Soviet
Union countries (specifically Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) as large exporters may be changing the price
dynamics in the world market [4]. The growing importance of wheat production in Europe would make
local supply and demand relatively more relevant to
determine wheat prices in Europe. Hence, European
producers and merchandisers would naturally seek a
futures contract based in Europe, which should better
reflect their supply and demand conditions and should
allow them to manage their local basis more effectively.
The article argues that this is one of the main reasons
behind the increase in trading activity for the futures
contract on milling wheat offered by the Euronext exchange in Paris in recent years. The U.S. futures markets for wheat are still the central stage for wheat pricing in the world market, but the Europe-futures market
for milling wheat has also become an important pricing
platform.
Another example could be the futures contracts for agricultural commodities in China, such as the ones traded at the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE). The
growing participation of China in the world market for
commodities (such as corn and soybeans) resembles the
case of wheat discussed above, although in much larger
magnitude. However, there are restrictions for foreign
traders who want to trade in futures markets in China,
which limits the ability of these futures markets to become active pricing platforms for commodities in the
world market.
Back to the idea of a South American soybean futures
contract: Do we need another futures contract for soybeans?
The general notion that recent trade disputes have
affected the price dynamics in the soybean world market and hence “destabilized” the relationship between
U.S. and Brazilian prices would, in principle, justify
looking into a new futures contract to hedge Brazilian
soybeans. However, it is not yet clear what lies ahead. If
trade disputes are resolved and we return to the
“traditional” price dynamics between U.S. and Brazilian
prices, there may be no need for a new futures con-

tact. If trade disputes persist, a new futures contract may be
useful depending on how the new price dynamics develop.
Looking ahead: May there be room for a new futures contract for corn?
The discussion about the potential for a new South American soybean futures contract brings to mind the changes
that have been taking place in the corn market. In the last
10-15 years, Brazil has emerged as a major producer and
exporter, as has the Ukraine more recently. The growing
participation of Brazil and Ukraine and relatively smaller
share of the United States in the world market raises the
question of whether U.S. markets are still the central stage
for corn pricing in the world. Although the answer is still
likely to be yes, this could be changing in coming years. Recent articles that looked into the price dynamics in the corn
market suggest that Brazil and Ukraine are already becoming more influential in corn pricing in the world market [5,
6, 7, 8]. If this movement continues in the future, in a few
years we may be reading about ideas to launch new futures
contracts for corn based in South America and/or Europe
(or about increasing trading activity in the corn futures
contracts already offered by B3 in Brazil and Euronext in
France).
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